We investigate the causal e¤ect of lump-sum severance payments on job search duration in Norway. Identi…cation is achieved by exploiting discontinuities in the available amounts along the age and time dimensions. The results can be interpreted as evidence of liquidity constraints, thus suggesting that in the spirit of the Baily-Chetty model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance current bene…ts are too low. Since Norway has one of the most equitable wealth distributions and one of the most generous UI systems of all OECD economies, this suggests that liquidity constraints are likely to matter also in other OECD economies.
Introduction
Should the generosity of unemployment insurance be increased, to allow individuals to search longer and …nd a better-…tting job? Or should it be reduced, so as to decrease the severity of Moral Hazard? These questions continue to ignite heated political debates across OECD economies. Much of the academic literature for a long time seemed to support the latter contention: Papers like Katz and Meyer [1990] or Lalive et al. [2006] had shown that more generous unemployment insurance (UI) did prolong unemployment duration, and the common interpretation was one of pure Moral Hazard: Individuals take longer to …nd Work in progress. Comments are very welcome and should be sent to cbasten@eui.eu y Christoph Basten would like to thank Statistics Norway for their great hospitality during the work on this project. We are indebted for helpful guidance to Erzo Luttmer, Luigi Guiso and Andrea Ichino, and grateful to seminar audiences at Harvard, the EUI, Statistics Norway, Zurich, and the 2010 Christmas Meeting of German Economists Abroad. The usual disclaimer applies. a new job because someone else is paying. However, Chetty [2008] and Card et al. [2007a] ingeniously pointed out that part of the e¤ect of UI on job search duration could be an income rather than a price e¤ect: Individuals would like to choose a longer search duration also if they had to entirely …nance it themselves -but they cannot do so because …nancial markets fail to lend them the necessary liquidity. For a given severity of Moral Hazard, greater liquidity constraints call for higher UI in order to correct that market failure 1 . To investigate the empirical relevance of this consideration for Austria, Card et al. [2007a] estimate the e¤ect on job search duration of severance payments which by de…nition have no price e¤ect because they are granted lump-sum: They …nd it to be positive and interpret this as evidence that liquidity e¤ects do indeed matter, with the highly relevant implication that the generosity of the unemployment bene…ts paid in Austria during the sample period was below its optimal level. The …nding is argued to be indicative also for the US, since the two countries share many relevant labor market characteristics, including relatively low UI with a maximum duration (in normal times) of six months and a replacement rate of around 50%.
What however does this imply for most other OECD economies, where prevailing bene…t levels and durations are signi…cantly more generous? Does the …nding of liquidity constrained job losers apply there as well, or is UI there too generous, as many politicians and citizens would suspect? The present paper seeks to make a step in the direction of answering this question by investigating whether a causal e¤ect of lump-sum severance payments on job search duration can be found also in Norway, whose UI generosity is near the upper bound of all OECD economies -with replacement rates of 62.4% and maximum bene…t durations of at least two years for most job losers -while at the same time the average household holds comparatively high levels of wealth relative to annual income 2 . If we …nd an e¤ect of cash-on-hand on job search duration even here, then it seems plausible that similar …ndings would be made also in many other OECD economies.
To identify the causal e¤ect of lump-sum severance payments, we exploit discontinuities in the amount individuals are eligible for along the age and time dimensions, as agreed upon between the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, "Naeringslivets Hovedorganisasjon" (NHO), and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, "Landsorganisasjonen i Norge" (LO). Henceforth we shall refer to these agreements as the "(LO-NHO) scheme". Under these schemes, the amount of severance pay granted, displayed in Table 1 , becomes non-zero from age 50 onward, after which it increases every two years until age 58 and every single year thereafter until age 62, and then decreases each year until the …nal potential labor market year at age 66. In addition, within our period of observation, 1993-2008, the amounts for di¤erent age groups were discontinuously increased three times. The agreements cover all individuals who are involuntarily separated from one of the agreement's member plants after 10 or more years of tenure. While the variable tenure, which would otherwise also have been interesting for use as the running variable for a Regression Discontinuity Design, is not observed with su¢ cient precision, we fortunately do observe both layo¤ date and age precise to the day. This allows us to ‡exibly control for both of these running variables per se, thus identifying the causal e¤ect of di¤erent amounts of severance pay eligibility only o¤ of the discontinuities listed in Table 1 and displayed graphically for the age dimension (averaged across the 4 periods) in Figure 1 . To fully exploit the duration structure of our data, we combine this identi…cation strategy with a Cox Proportional Hazard model.
We …nd that on average each NOK 1,000 of severance pay lowers the job starting probability on any day within the …rst 2 years by about 1.4% relative to the baseline group aged just below 50 and who are hence not eligible for any severance pay. For the group aged just above 50 who in the most recent period received NOK 18,000, this implies a 25% lower job …nding hazard. Similar results are obtained when we focus on the discontinuity around age 50 alone, and are also con…rmed with Censored Normal Regressions using completed job search duration as the dependent variable. The results are robust to many di¤erent kinds of control function as well as di¤erent ways of censoring the job search duration, and the functioning of our control function is con…rmed by a number of suitable placebo regressions.
In a complementary section, we discuss the possibility that part of the reduced-form e¤ect of severance pay, rather than being evidence of liquidity constraints, may result from Mental Accounting behavior: Households might have a higher propensity to consume goods or leisure out of money mentally classi…ed as "income" than out of money classi…ed as "wealth". If they then classify the severance payments -which they receive when regular labor income drops -as income, we may see a causal e¤ect of such payments on job search duration even amongst households who are not formally liquidity-constrained. To empirically test the plausibility of the liquidity interpretation, we interact the severance pay amount with indicators for the di¤erent terciles of households' wealth distribution, on a wide range of di¤erent wealth measures, and test whether the size of the e¤ect is decreasing in prior wealth. While we do …nd the e¤ect to be slightly decreasing in a number of wealth measures, the patterns are not statistically signi…cant. Unfortunately we lack the necessary precision to make a conclusive statement on this issue and need to postpone this to future research. In practice though, we argue that the policy implications of Mental Accounting behavior, which can be interpreted as "internal liquidity constraints" are likely the same as those of external Liquidity Constraints.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains our Empirical Strategy and Section 4 introduces the data we use to implement it. Section 4 presents the general results on the e¤ect of lump-sum severance payments on job search duration. Section 5 addresses theoretically and empirically the possibility of Mental Accounting behavior, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
To identify the causal e¤ect of lump-sum severance payments on job-search duration, we exploit agreements …rst established in 1966 between Norway's Confederation of Trade Unions, "Landsorganisasjonen i Norge" (LO), and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, "Naeringslivets Hovedorganisasjon" (NHO) on severance payments ("Sluttvederlag", SLV) to workers losing their jobs. Under these agreements, employees are eligible for severance pay if and only if they are aged above 50 and have at least 10 years of tenure in their current plant or at least 15 years in several member plants. Furthermore, as Table 1 shows, the amount changes discontinuously, i.e. from one day to the next, at several other age thresholds as well as across four di¤erent time periods. A simple regression of job search duration on the theoretical severance pay amounts would in this setup not allow us to identify the causal e¤ect of severance pay, because for instance in the age range up until age 62 severance pay amounts are increasing in age, but age is likely to be correlated with search duration also through channels other than the severance pay amounts. Furthermore, nominal amounts are higher in later years, so that di¤erences across years in the tightness of the labor market or in the price level could lead our estimates to be biased.
The Control Function
However, since we are able to observe the day of layo¤ and each individual's age precise to the day, we are able to deal with this issue by controlling ‡exibly for any other factors correlated with age or time per se, and identify the causal e¤ect of severance pay eligibility o¤ of the discontinuous variation at the various age thresholds. In essence, we estimate the following equation for job search duration dur i;t :
To ensure that our control function does indeed fully take out the e¤ects of any factors correlated with age or time other than the severance payments, we repeat our analyses with a wide range of di¤erent control functions for age, and always include also a complete set of calendar year …xed e¤ects. We then test the functioning of our control functions on a placebo sample with similar age and tenure structure but coming from employers that were not participating in the severance pay scheme. As we discuss in more detail in the Section 4 below, we do …nd an "e¤ect of severance payments" in our placebo sample before adding the control function, con…rming the need for the latter, but not afterwards. We interpret this as suggesting that our control functions are indeed doing a good job.
In particular, we use speci…cations with six di¤erent control functions. Following Card et al. [2007a] and the papers cited therein, we start with a thirdorder polynomial in age, but for our most basic speci…cation we use only a single third-order polynomial in age for all intervals shown in Table 1 and for all four periods with di¤erent SP amounts. Next, we expand this to four separate polynomials, one for each of the four periods. In a third step, we replace the third-order polynomial with a Linear Spline (LS) in age: A separate linear function with a separate slope is then estimated for each age interval with a di¤erent severance pay amount. In a fourth step, we use instead a Restricted Cubic Spline (RCS), which allows the slopes to be nonlinear even within each of the intervals. The exact formulas of both kinds of spline are given in the appendix. Finally, in a …fth and sixth step we allow respectively for four separate Linear Splines and for four separate Restricted Cubic Splines, so as to take account of the di¤erent severance pay regimes listed in Table 1 . Table 4 , which we discuss in further detail in Section 4 below, shows that our estimator of interest is relatively robust to which control function we use. Therefore our main discussion of results will focus on the most basic speci…cation, controlling only for the third-order polynomial in age along with the set of calendar year …xed e¤ects.
Cox duration analysis and Censored Normal Regression
We combine the identi…cation strategy discussed above with a Cox Proportional Hazards Model (see Cox [1972] ). This is based on the concept of the hazard rate, which for any given period is de…ned as the number of individuals starting a new job divided by the current number of individuals not holding one. It is intended to re ‡ect the propensity to start a new job in a given period, conditional on not having done so until that point in time. Using this hazard rate, the Cox analysis then estimates the following equation
or equivalently in logs
where h 0 is the baseline hazard, i.e. the propensity to start a new job conditional on not having done so up until now, for some baseline reference group with x i = 0. The key assumption behind this speci…cation is that the e¤ect of covariates is proportional across all time periods (days in our case):
d log ht dX = = d log hs dX 8s; t: Our non-parametric Figures 7 and 8 where this assumption has not been imposed but curves for individuals with di¤erent values of the covariates are nonetheless mostly parallel, con…rm that this is a valid approximation of reality. At the same time, use of the Cox model has the advantage that we can leave the baseline hazard unspeci…ed. Hence our results will be independent of whether the latter is increasing, decreasing or constant over time, i.e. whether there is positive, negative or no "duration dependence". 3
Combining this with our discontinuity design then requires us to include in the set of regressors X both the assigned amount of severance pay S i and our control function in age and time per. Doing so then gives an equation of the following form:
In addition to our Cox analyses, we also estimate the e¤ect of severance pay on completed job search durations. To take into account that these durations have been censored, an issue we discuss in more detail below, we estimate these equations by Censored Normal Regression instead of the more standard Ordinary Least Squares. In contrast to Ordinary Least Squares estimates, the CNR ones prove relatively robust to how we censor the durations, albeit not as much as the Cox estimates, which con…rms our choice of focusing on the latter.
Testing for Manipulation of the Threshold
When seeking to identify a causal e¤ect o¤ of one or several discontinuities, two major challenges do typically arise. The …rst is potential manipulation of the threshold: In our context, employers or employees might systematically try to make the separation happen just before or just after the employee reaches a new integer age at which the severance pay amount changes, and if that is possible for some individuals then one has to worry that in those cases in which it works individuals may be either more or less keen to return to work than in the cases where it does not work. In considering whether this is an issue for us, a qualitative investigation of the context makes such "gaming" appear relatively unlikely: As severance payments under the LO-NHO scheme are made by the LO-NHO fund rather than the individual employer, and since employers'future dues to that fund are not "experience-rated", i.e. do not depend on the fund's past payouts to the company's ex-employees, the employer has no particular incentive to lay o¤ individuals just before they turn 50, 52, and so on. At the same time, the administration of the fund will work to ensure that employers do not systematically lay o¤ their employees just after the respective thresholds.
This said, we do of course wish to search empirically for any evidence of potential threshold manipulation To do so, Figures 2, 3 and 4 plot the frequency of separations in our …nal sample (as de…ned in Section 3) by age, using respectively quarterly, monthly and weekly age bins. Figures 5 and 6 then repeat the same exercise, with respectively monthly and weekly bins, focusing around the age 50 discontinuity only, which we analyze in more detail below. As can be seen, there is no evidence of separations spiking either just before or just after severance payments increase or decrease, con…rming the more qualitative picture given above. 6
Other Discontinuities and Censoring
The second major threat to identi…cation is the possibility that other things also change at the thresholds. In general our research has not detected any such changes at the discontinuities under consideration, except however for two of our three larger discontinuities at respectively ages 60 and 62: Norwegian employees who lose their job at or after age 62 are then eligible to receive unemployment bene…ts continuously until the o¢ cial retirement age of 67, rather than just for the usual maximum duration of 2 years. As a consequence, someone losing his job at or after age 60 can …rst fully exhaust the standard maximum duration of 2 years and then make use of the other rule. A possible way to deal with this is to censor job search durations before those critical thresholds: Then individuals separating from their jobs only after reaching age 60 or 62 will not be part of the analysis at all, and those who separate say N days before but are still without a job when reaching the threshold will only be used to compute the hazard rate, i.e. the number of job …nders relative to the number currently without a job, only on his …rst N days but not thereafter. Table 5 shows the results of estimating the most basic speci…cation of our Cox regressions censoring at respectively the formal retirement age of 67 and the potentially problematic ages 62 and 60. It also varies the job search duration after which we censor between 2 years, the maximum duration for which everyone in our sample can receive UI bene…ts, and 6 months, the maximum duration for which individuals can receive UI in Austria and hence the censoring duration used in Card et al. [2007a] . It turns out that the e¤ect of severance payment in our sample is economically and statistically signi…cant under all possible censoring choices. To be on the safe side however, we henceforth make the most conservative choice and censor already at age 60. The …nding that our results do not hinge on other things changing at thresholds 60 and 62 is also con…rmed in the results section when we conduct a simpler Regression Discontinuity Design exploiting only the third larger discontinuity, at age 50. 4 3 Data and Measurement
Data Sources and Sample De…nition
We use administrative data from Norwegian tax registers that cover the universe of Norwegian taxpayers. Our records on job separations are taken from Norwegian social security registers and we start with all job separations occurring between 1993 and 2008 out of plants that were party to the severance pay agreement drawn up between the labor union, LO, and the employer organization, NHO. For the placebo sample we employ all the same restrictions, but take only individuals from plants that did not participate in the agreement. In both cases, we retain those aged between 45 and 66 at the day of leaving their job (although our main results are only based on individuals aged below 60, see Section 2), because eligibility for any severance payment starts only at age 50, and because 67 is the regular retirement age. We drop all those entering early retirement. Early retirement is possibly endogenous and therefore might lead to bias if our results depended on individuals eligible for early retirement, but our choice of censoring durations at age 60 takes care of this. As indicated above, individuals are eligible for severance pay only if the separation is declared to be involuntary, a status which we cannot observe directly. We drop individuals who are observed to start a new job just on the subsequent calendar day. Many of these job "changes" are purely administrative records of individuals who merely switch to a di¤erent position within the same …rm. Some are changes to a new employer and in principle a subset of these might be cases in which the individual was laid o¤ from the previous job and able to secure a directly following new job already within the 3-month notice period. Such an individual might be eligible for severance pay. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority of such cases would take more than one day before starting a new job, and that the set of those starting a new job already the next day will therefore almost entirely be composed of individuals leaving their old job voluntarily precisely because they wish to start a new job. We have however also tried our main regressions on the larger sample still including those who start a new job just the next day, and the results are qualitatively unchanged. Furthermore, for our main sample we drop those registered as being out of their job for precisely one speci…c calendar year and which we think are likely to be data errors, but again the results hold also when we do not impose this rule. Finally, while Card et al. [2007a] drop those returning to their old …rm, on the grounds that these are likely to know about this return already at the point of leaving and will thus likely not be truly searching, we retain them in our sample for our main results as we think that the sample of individuals allowed to return will be endogenous, and since those whose …rm o¤ers them a subsequent job lose their severance pay eligibility only if this new job starts already within 3 months of separating from the old job. But in the results sections below we will also display the results obtained when excluding returners in addition; we …nd that the estimated e¤ects become very slightly smaller then. Furthermore, we require individuals to have earned at least the (very low) "minimum amount" (Grunnbeløpet) required for eligibility for at least two years of UI, so that our sample is homogeneously eligible for the same UI. Finally, the results displayed in Tables 4 ¤. are for males only. In the subsample of females the e¤ect is also found, but the average e¤ect is much weaker and not statistically signi…cant, and so we focus on the sample of males so as to obtain more precise point estimates, also for our subsequent analyses for which we stratify the sample by tercile of wealth.
Restricting the Sample by measured Tenure
As we have pointed out above, eligibility for LO-NHO severance pay requires a continuous tenure of at least 10 years in the current plant, or a combined tenure of at least 15 years in plants that were all members of the scheme. Hence in order to correctly estimate the size of the severance pay e¤ect, we would like to include in our sample all those who satisfy this requirement and exclude all those who do not. This is complicated somewhat by the fact that we do not observe everyone's past job history for 15 or more years, and that we do not observe which tenure interruptions -such as maternity leave and some speci…c types of sick leave -were for severance pay eligibility purposes counted as continuation of the previous job. This is also why we cannot implement a Regression Discontinuity Design with tenure as the running variable, as we might otherwise have wanted to do. For our identi…cation strategy pointed out above it means that we are able to identify a subsample of individuals for whom we know that they satis…ed the tenure requirement. By contrast, amongst those for whom we do not know this some will and some will not have ful…lled the requirement. To get our point estimates of the e¤ect of severance pay right, we make the conservative choice of using only those individuals for whom tenure is known to be at least 10 years. 5 This restriction shrinks our sample size to about 10% and so the question arises to what extent the sample on which our analyses are based is still representative for the larger population without the tenure restriction. To answer this question, Table 2 presents summary statistics …rst for the full sample and then for the subsample used. We …nd that our subsample is on average about 9 years older, more educated and has higher income and wealth. A priori, one would expect these factors to lead to lower liquidity constraints, and so it may be expected that our results must be interpreted as lower bounds on the e¤ect that would be found if our quasi-experiment and data allowed us to identify the severance pay e¤ect also for those with lower measured tenure.
Intention-to-Treat vs. Wald Estimators
A last restriction from our data is that, since severance payments are not taxable, we do not observe the amounts actually received, as would be necessary to compute the "Wald" estimate of the e¤ect of actual severance pay on job search duration, i.e. to instrument actual with hypothetical payments. Instead, like Card et al. [2007a] , we can only estimate the Reduced-Form or Intention-to-Treat e¤ect of severance pay eligibility, which constitutes again a lower bound on the e¤ect of actual severance pay. We can however expect compliance amongst those eligible to be very high, since the claim forms are automatically sent to the LO-NHO joint o¢ ce by the employer, together with the layo¤ noti…cation.
De…ning the duration of Job Search
The previous literature analyzing the duration of unemployment or job search duration has commonly considered two measures thereof. The …rst is simply the period for which an individual is o¢ cially registered as unemployed, the second is the time between lay-o¤ and the start of a new regular job, and which Card et al. [2007a] denote "non-employment duration". Based on the …ndings in Card et al. [2007b] , they argue for the former, on the grounds that in their Austrian sample many individuals will leave the unemployment register after six months not because they have actually found a job, but only because their bene…ts expire so that they no longer have an incentive to keep registering at the agency.
In our setting this is less of a problem, because all employees in our sample are eligible for up to two years of bene…ts. Yet there are good reasons for us to also focus on the latter measure: As Bratsberg et al. [2010] and some of the papers cited therein point out, Norway has four times as many individuals receiving disability insurance as individuals receiving unemployment insurance, and many of the former would be assigned the latter label in other countries. At the same time, Autor and Duggan [2007] show that liquidity e¤ects are as relevant an issue for those on disability insurance as for those on unemployment insurance. Furthermore, the Mental Accounting scenario considered in Section 5 also applies also to those on disability insurance. Hence we use as outcome measure the duration from lay-o¤ until the start of a new job, thus capturing both individuals receiving unemployment bene…ts and those receiving disability bene…ts. An added bene…t of doing so is that it provides us with a larger sample size and hence ceteris paribus allows for greater statistical precision.
Measuring Household Wealth
In view of the previous literature on liquidity constraints of households, the most suitable de…nition of wealth should be …nancial wealth -including deposits, bonds, stocks and mutual funds, but not real estate -and measured at the household rather than the individual level. Nonetheless it is conceivable that transaction costs for stocks and bonds are so high that households use only deposits, or that transaction costs for real estate are so low that they can also use their real estate, or that many married individuals keep their budgets su¢ ciently separate that individual holdings matter more than a household's total holdings. Fortunately, our dataset is comprehensive enough that we can use total wealth, …nancial wealth and deposits alone, and each of these both at the individual and at the household level. 6 Of course how long someone can sustain the household with a given amount of savings will depend on the monthly expenditures such as monthly rent, insurance payments etc., which in turn will largely depend on prior income. On these grounds we subsequently repeat the same analyses stratifying the sample by the terciles of di¤erent "preparedness" measures, for which we scale the di¤erent wealth measures by the average income earned in the last three years before job loss.
Results

Non-and Semi-Parametric Graphical Analysis
Before implementing the Cox model, which assumes that the treatment e¤ect is the same in each stage of the job search duration, we start with non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival curves, plotting the fraction of individuals still without a new job against the days elapsed since the separation. Figure 7 plots these for individuals eligible for di¤erent amounts of severance pay and shows that on any day since the separation those eligible for higher amounts were indeed more likely to still be without a job than those eligible for lower amounts. Now this might of course be entirely due to other factors correlated with age and hence also correlated with the severance pay amounts. To inquire whether this is the case, Figure 8 continues with a semi-parametric analysis, plotting the same curves after controlling for our basic control function with a third-order polynomial in age and a complete set of calendar year dummies. To obtain these curves, we have …rst estimated a Cox model on the control function only, and have then used the resulting baseline hazard to plot Kaplan-Meier curves adjusted for the control function. We can clearly see that the pattern with higher "survival" probabilities for those eligible for higher severance pay persists also after adjusting for the control function. Now one may of course suspect that the control function is simply not comprehensive enough. To test this, we now repeat the same two analyses for our placebo sample (more on which below). The results of doing so, …rst without and then with control function, are displayed respectively in Figures 9 and 10 . Interestingly we see the qualitatively the same pattern as in our main sample before adding the control function, con…rming the need for the latter. After adding it however, the survival rates are no longer monotonously increasing in the severance pay amounts, indicating that our control function is working. The more formal analysis provided below will con…rm this. Also noteworthy is the fact that the curves are not always parallel, but are so most of the time, thus vindicating our subsequent use of the Proportional Hazards model. Table 4 shows the results of our main regressions for the di¤erent control functions discussed above. We …nd that for each NOK 1,000 of severance pay the propensity to …nd a job the next day is between 1.2 and 1.82% lower than for the comparison group of those aged just below 50 and who are therefore not eligible to receive any severance pay. All estimates are statistically signi…cant at the 5% level or lower, except for the one obtained with four separate Linear Splines, which is signi…cant at 6.5%. Focusing on our most basic control function, we obtain a point estimate of 1.44%, which implies a total e¤ect of about 25% for the NOK 18,000 (after-tax) payment available to those individuals aged just above 50 in the most recent period.
Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis
To con…rm that this coe¢ cient is not just re ‡ecting other, correlated factors not taken out by our control function, we repeat our analysis on the placebo sample. This has been obtained by imposing all the same restrictions as for our main sample, except that we now take only those plants that were not part of the LO-NHO scheme. Table 3 shows summary statistics for the two samples, which reveal that the individuals in the placebo sample have practically the same age, but tend to be somewhat more educated. Income and wealth di¤erences however do are not signi…cantly di¤erent economically. When we repeat the Cox regressions for this sample, displayed in Table 6 , we …nd either a positive (instead of negative, as in the main sample), or statistically insigni…cant e¤ect for all control functions, con…rming the validity of our estimation strategy.
Focusing on the Discontinuity around Age 50
In addition to our main sample, which now focuses on individuals aged between 45 and 60, we have also conducted a more standard Regression Discontinuity analysis focusing only on those aged between 48 and 52, where the two-year bandwidth has been chosen with a view to the fact that, as discussed above, the severance pay amount increases again from age 52 onwards. The results for the resulting subsample are displayed in Table 9 : Column (1), based on regressions without control function, implies an e¤ect of 25%, which corresponds to what we have computed on the basis of the full sample above. When we add year …xed e¤ects and respectively one 3rd-order polynomial in age for all 4 years or 2 separate ones for respectively those aged below and those aged above 50 on the day of job separation, this estimate increases to 46%, as displayed in columns (2) and (3). Columns (4) through (6) then repeat the same three analyses in a placebo setup in which we use individuals aged between 48 and 50, who are hence all ineligible for any severance pay, and estimate the e¤ect of being aged 49 or higher. None of the three speci…cations …nds an e¤ect that is statistically signi…cant at any reasonable level. Finally, columns (7) through (9) repeat again the same analysis now for a sample with the same age restrictions as columns (1) through (3), but now again for the placebo sample of individuals separating from non-LONHO plants. Again, no signi…cant e¤ect is found here, con…rming the validity of the …ndings in our main sample. Table 7 presents the results of our Censored Normal Regressions with completed job search duration as the dependent variable. For comparability, sample and control functions are exactly the same as in the Cox regressions reported in Table  4 above. Depending on the control function used, we …nd an e¤ect of between 4 and 5.6 days. The point estimate obtained with our most basic speci…cation, 4.2, implies a total e¤ect of 75 days or about 2.5 months for the NOK 18,000 payment received at age 50. Table 8 explores how robust these …ndings are to how we censor the job search duration and shows that durations are still fairly robust to the maximum age but not to whether we censor after 6 months or 2 years of completed duration, with estimates obtained with early censoring amounting to only 1.5-1.8 instead of 4.0-5.6 days. That suggests that the point estimates obtained with Cox regressions are more reliable, even if the direction and statistical signi…cance of the e¤ect remain robust also here.
Analyses of Completed Durations
Mental Accounting instead of Liquidity Constraints?
In the previous sections we have shown that the causal e¤ect of lump-sum severance payments on job search duration which Card et al. [2007a] found for Austria is robustly present also in Norway, making it plausible that the …nding applies also to other OECD economies. To this point we have simply adopted their interpretation of this reduced-form e¤ect as evidence of liquidity constraints, but in this complementary section we shall discuss also a possible alternative interpretation based on Mental Accounting.
Since this alternative hypothesis is an adaptation to the context of job loss and severance payments of the ideas advanced in Shefrin and Thaler [1988] , we start by summarizing the latter. At the core of that paper is the idea that individuals behave as if there coexisted two selves: A myopic "doer self" that is always concerned only with the current period, and a "planner self" concerned with maximizing a function of lifetime doer utilities. If the choices of consumption each period were left to the doer self, too much would be consumed in early periods, leading to a sub-optimal lifetime path of consumption. Restricting current consumption to a level below what is available in any given period however costs willpower. To address this problem, the "planner self" is then assumed to place constraints on future consumption choices already in advance, either through external commitment devices like pension plans or internal ones like rules-of-thumb.
One such rule is Mental Accounting: Rather than considering all money as fungible, households mentally assign all funds to di¤erent "mental accounts". The simplest version contains one account for "Current Income" (C), one for "Current Assets" (A) and one for "Future Income" (F). The rule-of-thumb then has the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) -the fraction of each additional dollar consumed right away -be highest for money classi…ed as C, lower for A, and lowest for F. In practice, households are likely to have more than just those three accounts, and di¤erent households will have di¤erent accounts, for their kids' education or other purposes. Furthermore, exactly which consumption choices this classi…cation results in will depend on the exact "framing", i.e. on which categories each account is de…ned to include and over which horizon each account is to be balanced. This categorization into three main accounts however is thought to be a good …rst approximation for the average household.
Building on this categorization, we suggest that if households do indeed classify money into I, A or F and are more willing to consume out of I than out of A or F, then the consumption of job-search time is likely to respond to severance pay even for households who are not formally, or externally, liquidityconstrained, because the severance pay, in contrast to prior savings, is likely to be classi…ed as "Current Income", seeing that it is paid out after lay-o¤ precisely when regular income drops to the UI replacement rate. Put di¤erently, households may implicitly understand the severance payments as speci…cally intended to be used for maintaining consumption while searching for an adequate new job, whereas prior savings are instead understood to be reserved for di¤erent purposes such as retirement or children's education. In the words of Shefrin and Thaler [1988] : "households treat components of their wealth as nonfungible, even in the absence of credit rationing." It is worth noting that conceptually Mental Accounting is in fact quite similar to standard liquidity constraints in that in both cases households would have the necessary (lifetime) wealth to increase spending now, yet cannot do so because the wealth is not available at that speci…c point in time or for that speci…c purpose. The di¤erence is …rstly that Mental Accounting arises through constraints that are internal rather than external, and secondly that -given the individual's temptation to spend excessively absent any commitment devices -the internal constraints are optimal as a second-best solution. 7
Just like the problem of liquidity constraints has a …rst-best policy solution, lending, and a possible second-best, increasing UI, there are several possible policy responses to the phenomenon of Mental Accounting. The …rst-best, given individuals'risk of myopia, would be to provide an external commitment device that still constrains myopic spending but does a better job at allowing higher spending if and only if that can be expected to increase lifetime utility, for instance by allowing the individual to …nd a …nancially or otherwise better subsequent job. But if, plausibly, such a policy is not possible, we are back with the same policy options as for Liquidity Constraints. So the policy responses to the …nding of severance pay e¤ects are overall similar, nonetheless a test of whether this e¤ect stems mostly from Liquidity Constraints or mostly from Mental Accounting can improve our understanding of what exactly is happening within the a¤ected households.
To do so, we have strati…ed our sample by terciles of the wealth distribution, where the terciles are de…ned separately within each calendar year. We strat-i…ed in turn by last year's income, total wealth, …nancial wealth (total wealth net of real estate holdings), and deposits, always …rst at the level of the husband only and then at the level of the total household, adding the assets of the wife, if any. All measures have …rst been winsorized at the 99th percentile to take care of outliers. Table 10 shows a summary of the wealth measures by their respective terciles. Then we re-estimate our previous Cox regressions, but interact the severance pay variable with indicators for being in the second or third terciles, and also control for the main e¤ect of being in those terciles. The interaction coe¢ cient can then be read to inform us whether the size of the severance pay e¤ect varies across the three terciles. The results of these analyses are displayed in Tables ?? and .12. We see that the size of the severance pay e¤ect is monotonously decreasing in wealth, household wealth, household …nancial wealth, but not in individual …nancial wealth, deposits, household deposits or any of these measures scaled by previous income. Also, none of the interaction coe¢ cients is statistically signi…cant at the conventional levels, except for that for scaled household …nancial wealth, where however the pattern is not monotonous. Overall, the …ndings do if anything provide some slight support for the Liquidity Constraints interpretation, but no conclusive conclusions on the issue are possible. The same …nding is reached when we stratify into halves or quartiles instead of terciles, or when we interact our severance pay variable with continuous measures of wealth. Hence, while we have robustly shown an e¤ect of lump-sum severance payments, further research is needed on which of the interpretations discussed here is the most appropriate.
Conclusion
We have shown a clear causal e¤ect of lump-sum severance payments on the duration of job search in Norway. To our knowledge, this is only the second paper in the literature to …nd such an e¤ect, and the …rst to …nd it in a Scandinaviantype welfare state. This makes it likely that such e¤ects hold also in other OECD economies. We have then discussed how this can be interpreted either as evidence of liquidity constraints, as in the previous literature, or alternatively as evidence of Mental Accounting behavior. No de…nitive conclusion could be reached on the which of these is the more appropriate interpretation, so that this issue will require further research in the future. Nonetheless, we can infer that slightly more generous unemployment bene…ts are likely to solve the problems faced by the households a¤ected, although it may not be the …rst-best policy response. Adjusted KM Curves for Placebo Sample Figure 10 : Semi-parametric Survival Curves, as in Figure 8 , but now for the placebo sample of individuals separated from plants that were not part of the severance pay agreement. Year 1994 Year 1994 Same regressions as in Table 4 , but for the Placebo Sample of individuals separated from planss that were not a member of the severance pay scheme. Outcome: E¤ect of each NOK 1,000 of severance pay on duration until new job in days Censored Normal Regressions, using the same control functions as in Table 4 . P-values in parentheses, based on robust and person-clustered SEs; *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 163.00 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** N 5, 870 5,870 5,192 5,192 4,666 4,666 As in Table 7 , but censoring at di¤erent ages and durations as indicated. E¤ect of being aged >=50 (1st placebo: 49) on propensity to start new job in 2 yrs after job loss, in %; Bandwidth ages 48-52 (placebo: 47-50);
"Aged" is deviation of Age from 50 (49); Besides the main sample analyses have been repeated for the placebo sample aged between 47 and 50 and who are hence all too young to get SP, and for a placebo sample of individuals from plants not participating in the SP agreement For each we have one speci…cation without controls, one with the 3rd-order polynomial in age plus year e¤ects, and one with separate control functions for left and right of the threshold; P-values in parentheses, based on robust and person-clustered SEs; *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 
4,324
We repeat the regressions from Table 4 , (1), but interact the assigned SP amount with indicators for the 3 terciles (T1-3) of di¤erent measures of income and wealth: Annual income, total wealth, …nancial wealth (stocks, bonds, cash, but not real estate) and deposits, each at the individual and the household level. Aged is the deviation of age from the sample mean. P-values in parentheses, based on robust and person-clustered SEs; *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 As Table 11 , but interacting with the terciles of di¤erent wealth measures scaled by annual income. P-values in parentheses, based on robust and person-clustered SEs; *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 36 8 Appendix II: Computation of the Spline Control Functions
The Linear Spline consists of elements V i; for i = 1; :::; n which -given the underlying continuous variable V (i.e. age) and knots k i ; f or i = 1; :::; n 1 at each age threshold with a change in the severance pay amount -are computed as follows: V 1 = min(V; k 1 ) V i = maxfmin(V; k 1 ); k i 1 g k i 1 ; i=2,...,n
The Restricted Cubic Spline consists of elements V i; for i = 1; :::; n 1 which -given the underlying continuous variable V (i.e. age) and knots k i ; f or i = 1; :::; n at each age threshold with a change in the severance pay amountare computed as follows: 
